China is melting down but no one knows it or sees it.
The signs are all there. Falling growth (everywhere). Myriad government attempts to pump liquidity and capital into the system. The market still in make believe mode.
Panic has not set in. Commodities have been the canary in the coal mine, but no one seems too concerned. My bet is the property development sector will provide the trigger. Weakness in the Yen has set about the next leg of the global currency wars. Stresses and strains are showing everywhere (Europe, Japan, Latam, Australia).
We are in the calm before the storm. Batten down the hatches.
A view of life, stocks, companies, the markets, and investing "through a glass, darkly."
Showing posts with label systemic risk. Show all posts
Showing posts with label systemic risk. Show all posts
Saturday, November 22, 2014
Saturday, June 21, 2014
Where Does The Biggest Risk(s) Lie?
In reflecting upon the many doomsayers prognostications regarding systemic risk in the system and their attempts to make the case that it is worse now than in 2008, I see their points but struggle to see the timing. Sure, we are likely to see a cyclical decline or recession. The markets no doubt will be hamstrung by that, but I don't get the sense of a systemic risk event predicated upon a Minskian leverage moment. To be true, corporate balance sheets are not as strong as the aggregate numbers may propose. Much of the cash outstanding is concentrated among a small number of mega sized firms, and that is quickly being netted off against debt issuance to fund stock buybacks. A troubling development in my book and one for caution. There are many who point to the "too big to fail" banks having grown even bigger. There are many who point to the economic recovery being anemic. There are many who point to ZIRP and QE as creating an artifice for asset prices. There are many who point to China. Many who point to the potential for hyperinflation. Many who point to the obesity of the Fed's balance sheet. The global financial system is connected and interconnected. It is a tightly coupled complex system prone to collapse. But I think it takes significant time to build imbalances via increasing leverage brought about by growing confidence leading to complacency and hubris. I don't think we are there yet. The greatest accumulation of debt/leverage has taken place on central bank balance sheets and country debt. I think that is where the next crisis will arise from. But until confidence is punctured, central banks and countries can continue to issue bonds and increase their liabilities. The puncture is likely to be an "emperor has no clothes" moment and will forever re-shape the global financial system as central banks become ground zero for fear and contagion.
Labels:
central banks,
complex systems,
normalizing,
QE,
systemic risk,
ZIRP
Friday, September 27, 2013
Playing with fire
From January 1941 through September 1981, per Bernstein's figures, U.S. Treasuries shed 67.3% of their real value.
At a 3% nominal yield and 2.5% long term average inflation…locking in 0.50% real return….if inflation really gets going then all bets are off...and that return doesn't even take account of taxes.
Here is the real risk. Catastrophic risk. I don't think it is deflation. That is because the central banks are already all in on that one. They have already told us in no uncertain terms that they will do everything they can to forestall deflation. Fine. I believe them. If deflation takes place then the CBs are going to combat it. I think the real risk is that they are skating on thin ice. They not only lack credibility (they have used much of it up) but they lack the capacity to expand the monetary base (it is already overextended/on borrowed time). The likely result is things flipping from deflation to hyperinflation as total trust and confidence in the system evaporates. They are skating a fine line right now. If they do manage to get us out of the fire, then they will have been incredibly lucky.
If we don't go into deflation again, then we risk rising inflation and potentially hyperinflation (although that would require a real shock to the system).
We have plastered over the cracks. The system is fragile. Our psyches are fragile. Confidence is fragile (although I think it is very much seeping into the system at the moment and could very easily take us to the next level). But the whole thing is a facade, an emperor with no clothes. No one knows when the music will stop again, but stop it will.
At a 3% nominal yield and 2.5% long term average inflation…locking in 0.50% real return….if inflation really gets going then all bets are off...and that return doesn't even take account of taxes.
Here is the real risk. Catastrophic risk. I don't think it is deflation. That is because the central banks are already all in on that one. They have already told us in no uncertain terms that they will do everything they can to forestall deflation. Fine. I believe them. If deflation takes place then the CBs are going to combat it. I think the real risk is that they are skating on thin ice. They not only lack credibility (they have used much of it up) but they lack the capacity to expand the monetary base (it is already overextended/on borrowed time). The likely result is things flipping from deflation to hyperinflation as total trust and confidence in the system evaporates. They are skating a fine line right now. If they do manage to get us out of the fire, then they will have been incredibly lucky.
If we don't go into deflation again, then we risk rising inflation and potentially hyperinflation (although that would require a real shock to the system).
We have plastered over the cracks. The system is fragile. Our psyches are fragile. Confidence is fragile (although I think it is very much seeping into the system at the moment and could very easily take us to the next level). But the whole thing is a facade, an emperor with no clothes. No one knows when the music will stop again, but stop it will.
Labels:
catastrophe,
central banks,
deflation,
hyperinflation,
monetary policy,
risk,
systemic risk
Tuesday, November 2, 2010
The Failure of the System
The primary failure of the system has been the unwillingness to allow markets to clear.
Whether it has been the unwillingness to allow housing to clear, or the unwillingness to let insolvent institutions go bust, or the unwillingness to address structural deficits or unfunded entitlement liabilities, markets must be allowed to clear when they become unbalanced.
Markets get out of whack for a variety of reasons. Whether it is due to externalities (poor regulation and regulators, perverse incentives, the guiding hand of the Fed, moral hazard, etc.), or because they reflect the mass delusion of crowds, markets need to be allowed to clear before they can operate effectively again. By shooting the messenger (thereby trying to prop up prices), authorities are addressing the symptoms rather than the cause.
In many ways, the crisis of the last few years has been a failure of the visible hand, as much as a failure of the invisible hand.
The reasons given for bailing out entities or propping up prices are noble (in a way). To defer, delay, take away the negative social effects/impact of market collapse (usually for political reasons). But there is a cost to artificial intervention, and sometimes the cost is greater than the initial price tag.
It remains to be seen how all of the bail-outs of the recent past will pan out.
Whether it has been the unwillingness to allow housing to clear, or the unwillingness to let insolvent institutions go bust, or the unwillingness to address structural deficits or unfunded entitlement liabilities, markets must be allowed to clear when they become unbalanced.
Markets get out of whack for a variety of reasons. Whether it is due to externalities (poor regulation and regulators, perverse incentives, the guiding hand of the Fed, moral hazard, etc.), or because they reflect the mass delusion of crowds, markets need to be allowed to clear before they can operate effectively again. By shooting the messenger (thereby trying to prop up prices), authorities are addressing the symptoms rather than the cause.
In many ways, the crisis of the last few years has been a failure of the visible hand, as much as a failure of the invisible hand.
The reasons given for bailing out entities or propping up prices are noble (in a way). To defer, delay, take away the negative social effects/impact of market collapse (usually for political reasons). But there is a cost to artificial intervention, and sometimes the cost is greater than the initial price tag.
It remains to be seen how all of the bail-outs of the recent past will pan out.
Labels:
economic system,
markets,
systemic risk
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
Living with the sword
Better get used to the daily angst of living with the sword of Damocles swinging overhead.
The world's economic problems are structural in extent, systemic in breadth, and long term in nature.
There are no short term fixes for the imbalances and problems that have been brought to the surface by the financial crisis.
With the possibility of a bomb going off at anytime, the market will struggle for sustained confidence and likely vacillate in ranges.
The world's economic problems are structural in extent, systemic in breadth, and long term in nature.
There are no short term fixes for the imbalances and problems that have been brought to the surface by the financial crisis.
With the possibility of a bomb going off at anytime, the market will struggle for sustained confidence and likely vacillate in ranges.
Labels:
imbalances,
structural problems,
systemic risk
Thursday, February 25, 2010
A risk you've got to take
Ever since the govt decided to be fully committed to "solving" the crisis, the key has been to re-boot growth. Failure to do so, means you end up in a worse position than when you started.
The paradox, or the dilemma, is that in order to re-boot the economy you must cover the growth shortfall by creating demand (in the hope that this artifical stimulus will get you across the growth divide). Unfortunately, given the weak starting position of the govt's balance sheet, options are limited and running out, and any failure to re-ignite growth poses serious risk to the economy and the financial system (again).
In other words, having already committed to the current course of action, the government has no choice, but to go for it (it is already "all in"). Conversely, if it fails and the markets lose faith, then we have a bigger problem on our hands.
With each lapse or fault in the market/economy, the government will continue to bail with all its might. It has no choice. But in so doing, it raises the chance of bringing about a collapse in the system (markets call their bluff...an emperor with no clothes). Confidence is a psychological phenomenon. It is transitory. The general stability of the markets/economy to which we are accustomed, mask a more fragile reality.
Sadly, the risk you've got to take increases the chance of failure.
The paradox, or the dilemma, is that in order to re-boot the economy you must cover the growth shortfall by creating demand (in the hope that this artifical stimulus will get you across the growth divide). Unfortunately, given the weak starting position of the govt's balance sheet, options are limited and running out, and any failure to re-ignite growth poses serious risk to the economy and the financial system (again).
In other words, having already committed to the current course of action, the government has no choice, but to go for it (it is already "all in"). Conversely, if it fails and the markets lose faith, then we have a bigger problem on our hands.
With each lapse or fault in the market/economy, the government will continue to bail with all its might. It has no choice. But in so doing, it raises the chance of bringing about a collapse in the system (markets call their bluff...an emperor with no clothes). Confidence is a psychological phenomenon. It is transitory. The general stability of the markets/economy to which we are accustomed, mask a more fragile reality.
Sadly, the risk you've got to take increases the chance of failure.
Wednesday, February 24, 2010
Eye of the hurricane
We are in the eye of the hurricane.
"the eye is characterized by light winds and clear skies, surrounded on all sides by a towering, symmetric eyewall."
The seas (economic data) are still choppy (mixed), because we have cross-currents coming from all directions (sovereign systemic risk concerns, stimulus withdrawal effects, state/local crisis, 2nd wave of mortgage defaults, high unemployment, China bubbling, commercial real estate teetering, Japan a mess).
This should be a time of preparation for the backend of the hurricane (more wind and rain). The consumer will continue to deleverage, while the govt will continue to bail. Should confidence in the govts ability to bail erode, then the system is at greater risk. It is going to be touch and go this time around, but if we do avoid another meltdown, then we have only deferred it for another day.
"the eye is characterized by light winds and clear skies, surrounded on all sides by a towering, symmetric eyewall."
The seas (economic data) are still choppy (mixed), because we have cross-currents coming from all directions (sovereign systemic risk concerns, stimulus withdrawal effects, state/local crisis, 2nd wave of mortgage defaults, high unemployment, China bubbling, commercial real estate teetering, Japan a mess).
This should be a time of preparation for the backend of the hurricane (more wind and rain). The consumer will continue to deleverage, while the govt will continue to bail. Should confidence in the govts ability to bail erode, then the system is at greater risk. It is going to be touch and go this time around, but if we do avoid another meltdown, then we have only deferred it for another day.
Labels:
eyewall,
hurricane,
risk,
risk factors,
systemic risk
Saturday, May 2, 2009
Where There Is Smoke, There Is Fire
Excellent Weekend Interview in the WSJ, highlighting the rot (basically poor structure, corrupt practices, and perverse incentives...sound familiar) that exists within the US legal system ("He Fought the Tort Bar - and Won").
Given our recent experience of an unsustainable imbalance (financial crisis), it reminded me of the importance of identifying other areas in the system that are rotten. These will be ruled by Stein's law "if something can't go up forever, it will stop."
There is a price to be paid for corruption. And, there is a day of reckoning. Getting a handle on how and when it will play itself out is the hard part. But first you must identify where the problems lay.
Here are a few suggestions of unsustainable imbalances:
Political/democratic process and systems - perverted by money
Healthcare - perverted by vested interests
Tertiary Education - 10% pa inflation unsustainable
Defense spending - military/industrial complex + political ideology
Unfunded Entitlement Liabilities - self-evident
Fiscal Deficit, Current Account Deficit, Govt Indebtedness - not sustainable, but...
I think that each will have their "Minsky Moment" but the damage from their fallout, in most cases, will be less severe than an overly leveraged financial system (the multipliers there are huge).
I will talk much more about these things at another time, as well as possible ideas as to how each of their unravelings may play out.
P.S. While we are essentially on the subject of systemic risk factors, here are two other substantive risk factors with systemic possibilities - inflation and deflation. More on those at another time also.
Given our recent experience of an unsustainable imbalance (financial crisis), it reminded me of the importance of identifying other areas in the system that are rotten. These will be ruled by Stein's law "if something can't go up forever, it will stop."
There is a price to be paid for corruption. And, there is a day of reckoning. Getting a handle on how and when it will play itself out is the hard part. But first you must identify where the problems lay.
Here are a few suggestions of unsustainable imbalances:
Political/democratic process and systems - perverted by money
Healthcare - perverted by vested interests
Tertiary Education - 10% pa inflation unsustainable
Defense spending - military/industrial complex + political ideology
Unfunded Entitlement Liabilities - self-evident
Fiscal Deficit, Current Account Deficit, Govt Indebtedness - not sustainable, but...
I think that each will have their "Minsky Moment" but the damage from their fallout, in most cases, will be less severe than an overly leveraged financial system (the multipliers there are huge).
I will talk much more about these things at another time, as well as possible ideas as to how each of their unravelings may play out.
P.S. While we are essentially on the subject of systemic risk factors, here are two other substantive risk factors with systemic possibilities - inflation and deflation. More on those at another time also.
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